

What lessons can operational planners infer from the  
NATO Partnership for Peace Program for the execution of  
contemporary US Regionally Aligned Force and UK  
Adaptable Force Security Cooperation missions?

A Monograph

by

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## **Abstract**

What lessons can operational planners infer from the NATO Partnership for Peace Program for the execution of contemporary US Regionally Aligned Force and UK Adaptable Force Security Cooperation missions? by Maj John A. Jeffcoat, 95 pages.

This research paper tested the thesis that Partnership for Peace (PfP) provides empirical evidence demonstrating the soundness of using security cooperation as a means for pursuing the end of regional stability. The inferences from this evidence are useful for military planners executing contemporary security cooperation initiatives.

Analysis of PfP, considering the goals NATO set and in relation to perceptions of Return on Investment (RoI) found that the program is an unqualified success. 4 key inferences for contemporary operational art were identified from a comparative case study. The principles of experimentation, multilateralism, narrative substantiation and promoting shared security cultures are equally applicable in the current operating environment.

Ultimately, security cooperation is a means amongst many, but one that is central to the western network of alliances and partnerships that guarantees the security of the international system. Increasing complexity in the international system has resulted in the emergence of significant near term threats and medium term risks; the creation and maintenance of security cultures offers a strong hedge against uncertainty and an effective means to promote the universal norms that have delivered and continue to deliver unprecedented human security and development.

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## **Acronyms**

ABCA	American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' program
AF	Adaptable Forces
AWfC	Army Warfighting Challenges
BVS	Bilateral Vision Statement
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSCE	Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
DoD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMF	Foreign Military Funding
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IPAP	Individual Partner Action Plan
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAO	National Audit Office
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PESA	Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
RoI	Return on Investment

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SSR Security Sector Reform

UN United Nations

WIF Warsaw Initiative Fund

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## **Section I – Introduction**

Democracies tend to have low tolerance for policies that do not show swift gains, and tangible results were not intended in Pericles' clever design.

—Everett Dolman, *Pure Strategy*

In truth, the acme of the military art is to get the enemy to “give in” in advance and to do so discreetly, by intervening upstream before the conflict unfolds and thus without having to join serious battle subsequently.

—François Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy*

Since 2012, the armies of the United States and the United Kingdom have placed security cooperation as a means of pursuing strategic objectives at the center of their respective visions of the future operating environment. The hypotheses behind the overseas engagement elements of the US Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and the British Army Adaptable Force (AF) concepts are broadly similar; judicious and early engagement in building partner capacity will increase regional stability thus negating the need for costly interventions further down the line. Security cooperation has long been a feature of both army's activities. One example that both armies have made significant contributions to in recent times is the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. This is a comprehensive initiative that since 1994 has enabled substantial Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Eastern European and Central Asian countries.

Security cooperation is a complicated and dynamic activity that includes interrelationships at multiple levels over extended timeframes. The military is but one part of the whole of government approach required to effect meaningful change. Generally, the military is an instrument of national power that seeks decisive outcomes in the near term. Consequently, in relation to security cooperation, there is a potential mismatch between more open systems of strategic aspiration with more closed systems of tactical determination. Accurately appreciating

the nature of the systems and factors involved with security cooperation will avoid the potential pitfall of privileging the tactical over the strategic. Resolving the tensions between the strategic and the tactical requires the effective application of operational art. A failure to appreciate, reconcile and exploit these tensions when conducting security cooperation increases the risk of undesirable conditions or tendencies emerging. Amongst others, these risks include irrelevance and incongruence with policy makers at home, unintended security dependencies or even increased regional instability.

The thesis of this paper is that PfP provides empirical evidence demonstrating security cooperation is a proven means of pursuing strategic objectives. It is possible to use this evidence to draw inferences for the application of operational art in contemporary security cooperation initiatives pursuing similar desired strategic conditions.

The purpose of this study is to provide a historical grounding for the ongoing application of contemporary security cooperation programs by assessing the impact of PfP on the Euro-Atlantic security environment. In particular, this study analyzes whether PfP provides relevant evidence that can directly contribute to the application of contemporary operational art in the execution of the RAF and AF missions. The design and execution of PfP offers insight not only on the pursuit of strategic objectives through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space and purpose but primarily on their integration with other national and international policy objectives. As such it is a relevant case study for expanding the general understanding of operational art and specific doctrinal concepts such as Unified Action (American) and Integrated Action (British).

The wider significance of this study is as a contribution to the understanding of security cooperation as a means for pursuing strategic objectives. It does so by testing the underlying

hypothesis behind upstream capacity building as a cost effective measure that delivers regional stability through effective SSR. The specific significance of this research monograph is in response to the following documents. First, the analysis is in direct support of US-UK Bilateral Strategic Vision (BVS) statement signed by the American Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and the British Chief of the General Staff (CGS) on 27 March 2013.<sup>1</sup> Second, it addresses elements of US Army Warfighting Challenges 1, 2, 3, 14 and 19.<sup>2</sup> Third, it expands upon the implications of forthcoming UK Integrated Action doctrine and how operational art can enable successful security cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

This study concerns itself with analyzing security cooperation as a means to effect SSR that in turn enhances regional stability. It is therefore important to define each of these terms from the outset. In line with Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5132.03, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) defines security cooperation as,

The full continuum of activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that build defense and security relationships promoting specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; that develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and that provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A copy of the statement is at Appendix 1. An addendum is scheduled for release in Spring 2016.

<sup>2</sup> “Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC)”, *Army Capabilities Integration Center*, last modified June 29, 2015, accessed July 18, 2015, <http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/army-warfighting-challenges.aspx>.

<sup>3</sup> Doctrine Note 15/01 *Integrated Action* (Warminster, Directorate Land Warfare, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> “Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020”, *Defense Security Cooperation*

The UK categorizes these types of activities under the term International Defence Engagement. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) defines this as “the means by which we use our defence assets and activities short of combat operations to achieve influence” whose scope includes the following,

treaties and alliances; senior level visits; our defence attaché network; civilian defence advisors; loan service personnel; overseas exchange and liaison officers; overseas training teams; security sector reform; international defence training; conventional deterrence and reassurance; overseas joint exercises; ship, unit and aircraft visits; and support to UK defence sales and international defence industry cooperation.<sup>5</sup>

Noting the differences, such as the exclusion of combat operations from the MOD’s definition, for ease of analysis and comparison, this study will make use of the term security cooperation in reference to both the US and UK as a collective term for the activities undertaken by RAF and AF as part of their overseas engagement missions. This does not imply that security cooperation is the *raison d’être* for either RAF or AF nor that they are solely responsible for delivering the land component contribution to security cooperation initiatives. Furthermore, the Bilateral Vision Statement originally signed by the respective heads of the American and British armies in 2013 explicitly refers to security cooperation as one of three shared objectives.<sup>6</sup>

A further aide to analysis places the broad spectrum of security cooperation activities within the wider rubric of Security Sector Reform (SSR). This is because SSR provides a nexus

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Agency, last modified October 2014, accessed August 17, 2015, <http://www.dsca.mil/2014-strategic-plan-vision-2020>.

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Defence, *International Defence Engagement Strategy* (London, gov.uk, 2013), last modified February 7, 2013, accessed July 21, 2015, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/73171/defence\\_engagement\\_strategy.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/73171/defence_engagement_strategy.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix 1.

between military and civilian activity in the development sphere. It is an integrating concept that originated in the UK in 1998<sup>7</sup> resulting from a consensus that emerged between the MOD, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID).<sup>8</sup> UK joint doctrine defines it as “reforming security institutions so that, under the control of a legitimate authority, they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security”.<sup>9</sup> US army doctrine defines it “as an umbrella term that discusses reforming the security of an area”.<sup>10</sup> For the purposes of this paper it provides a whole of government perspective as a way to integrate the tactical activities of the US and UK militaries that relates to both PfP and contemporary security cooperation initiatives.

If security cooperation is the means with SSR as the way, then regional stability is the end with which this study is concerned. One ready method of defining regional stability for this paper is to defer to former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart and appropriate his famous definition of pornography, ‘I know it when I see it’.<sup>11</sup> It is a subjective assessment of numerous

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<sup>7</sup> Mark Sedra, *Security Sector Reform 101: Understanding the Concept, Charting Trends and Identifying Challenges* (The Centre for International Governance Innovation, April 2010), last modified April 2010, accessed August 17, 2015, [https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR%20101%20Final%20\(April%2027\).pdf](https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR%20101%20Final%20(April%2027).pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Nicole Ball, Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: The Security Sector Reform Strategy, (Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC & Associated Consultants for Department for International Development 1 April 2004), accessed August 17, 2015, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67927/ev647ssr.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67927/ev647ssr.pdf), 48.

<sup>9</sup> Joint Doctrine Publication 3-90 (JDP 3-90) Civil Military Co-Operation (London, gov.uk, 2012), 1-8.

<sup>10</sup> Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 (ADRP 3-07) Stability (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-4.

<sup>11</sup> Peter Lattman, “The Origins of Justice Stewart’s ‘I Know It When I See It’”, *The Wall*

conditions made by strategic actors that defies easy categorization. Nonetheless it is more than just a self-evident desirable condition. Another measure of regional stability as a strategic objective is deduced as part of its overall contribution to maintaining positions of relative advantage amongst allies and between adversaries. As such, pursuing regional stability forms part of a competitive strategies approach. This approach seeks to employ limited aims in times of peace to deter potential adversaries thereby avoiding potentially ruinous contingency costs.<sup>12</sup>

The theoretical framework of this study is to use the theory of constructivism to explain the deliberate exploitation of emergent phenomena in the international system to create or sustain desired conditions such as those outlined in the preceding paragraph. The concept of operational art is used as a model to analyze a historical instance of security cooperation and its specific interrelationships with SSR and regional stability to determine if there is any applicability for similar contemporary initiatives. This theoretical and conceptual construct is used to explore the following three hypotheses that test the overall thesis of this study.

The first hypothesis states that PfP provides evidence that security cooperation is a proven means of pursuing strategic objectives. This will be tested by determining if the Policy, Strategic & Military Objectives behind PfP were met by NATO. This analysis will be supplemented by exploring the relationship between the cost of PfP to the perceived Return on

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Street Journal, last modified September 27, 2007, accessed August 18, 2015,  
<http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/27/the-origins-of-justice-stewarts-i-know-it-when-i-see-it/>.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas G Mahnken, “Small States Have Options Too: Competitive Strategies against Aggressors”, Commentary (War on the Rocks, January 27, 2016), last modified January 27, 2016, accessed January 27, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/small-states-have-options-too-competitive-strategies-against-aggressors/>.

Investment (ROI). If PfP represents good value for money, then it is a worthy starting point for framing contemporary security cooperation efforts that seek to offset future contingency costs by judicious upstream investments in capacity building.

The second hypothesis contends that there is a mismatch in the integration of ends, ways and means in contemporary American and British security cooperation initiatives. This hypothesis will be tested by determining the specific US and UK strategic objectives that the means of contemporary security cooperation support and what measures thus far have been taken to integrate them by the armies of both countries. Potential tensions identified in current approaches may benefit from attenuation based upon understanding the historical instance of PfP.

The third hypothesis argues that it is possible to use the example of PfP to draw inferences for the application of operational art in resolving the dilemmas inherent in contemporary American and British security cooperation initiatives. This will be tested by determining the applicable differences and similarities between PfP and current security cooperation initiatives in terms of strategic context and considering the role of operational art.

The basic assumption this study relies upon is that PfP is a proven initiative that has applicability today. It assumes that operational art played a role in successfully resolving tensions between strategic and tactical by integrating tactical imperatives firmly into international and multilateral policy objectives. It assumes that the multilateralism and whole of government approach that characterized PfP is not reflected in the more unilateral and DoD/MOD focused approach to the RAF/AF concepts. Therefore, there is a risk that these tactical level activities will not similarly contribute to improved strategic conditions. The present desire of the lead RAF and AF units to go forth and do good things at the tactical level based upon the assumption that over time they will constitute strategic success does not in and of itself guarantee effective integration

of ends, ways and means. If accurate, these assumptions portend poorly for the success of contemporary security cooperation initiatives given the tensions inherent in the twin epigraphs set out at the beginning of this study.

This research paper is organized into sections as follows. This section, the introduction, is followed by a literature review in Section II that will survey the current discourse on the field of security cooperation. Section III lays out the structured focus methodology of the case study that comprises Section IV. The case study section is broken down into three sub-sections that examine PfP, contemporary security cooperation and relevant inferences respectively. The synthesis of the findings from the case study are presented in Section V, the conclusion. The study is limited to unclassified reports, assessments and doctrine covering 1994 until the present. This limitation will constrain detailed analysis of specific ongoing security cooperation missions.

## **Section II - Literature Review**

The literature surrounding security cooperation, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and regional stability is vast. As discrete topics, they go to the very heart of international relations and the functioning of the international system. This section will survey the broad theory of constructivism that links them and then focus on the key concept of operational art pertinent to this study. It will then consider empirical analysis of the intent behind PfP and its similarity to the genesis of contemporary American Regional Aligned Forces (RAF) and British Adaptable Force (AF) concepts. This will demonstrate the underlying rationale of using Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an applicable case study for the application of operational art in executing contemporary security cooperation initiatives.

In his 2013 review of International Relations theory and security cooperation, Harald Müller finds “none of the theoretical perspectives on security cooperation is fully satisfactory”.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, his analysis of the constructivist approach leads him to conclude that it is the “best fit” compared with other approaches such as realism, rationalism & postmodernism.<sup>14</sup> This is because constructivism emphasizes managing change. In particular, how individuals and collectives best learn to exploit emergent circumstances creatively. “The constructivist ontology in which neither structure nor agency is unchangeable, but mutually modifiable and changeable, supports that emphasis {on change}.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Harald Müller, “Security Cooperation”, in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter E. Carlsnaes, Beth A. Simmons, and Thomas Risse, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2013), 626.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 627.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 620.

Furthermore, according to Müller, the process of change over time creates security cultures, which he defines as “a set of values, norms, rules, and practices” shared by multiple states.<sup>16</sup> This analysis tallies closely with the work of Christoph Meyer in his book, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture*. He adopts a constructivist approach for his analysis and his definition of a security culture, while more specific in defining the role of “influential actors and social groups within a given political community”, is the same as that of Müller.<sup>17</sup>

Theoretically, constructivism serves as a sound basis for understanding how security cooperation relationships potentially develop into mutually beneficial security cultures over time. The purposeful creation of mutually beneficial security cultures aligns with goals laid out in both the US and UK policy statements regarding strategy and security cooperation.<sup>18</sup>

Alongside these lofty goals, there is also a more hardheaded rationale for pursuing security cooperation at the national policy level. Executed effectively, it is far cheaper investing in conflict prevention than funding large-scale interventions and consequence mitigation. Malcolm Chalmers empirically substantiated the “prevention better than cure” aphorism in 2007. At the behest of the UK government, his analysis of six case studies demonstrated that “targeted programmes of conflict prevention are (or would have been) significantly cheaper than cure” and that on average

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 620-622.

<sup>17</sup> Christoph O Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, 1st ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 20.

<sup>18</sup> See for example US Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance Factsheet, page 2, published 5 April 2013 and the UK National Security Strategy, National Security Tasks 3, 4 and 8, page 33, published October 2010.

“A spend of £1 on conflict prevention will, on average; generate savings of £4.1 to the international community”.<sup>19</sup>

Seeking stability through normative relations while reducing costs provides mutually beneficial values that allows for the creation of multilateral strategic cultures posited by constructivist theory. As a discrete example of constructivism, SSR has become a widely accepted norm in rationalizing security cooperation between the developed and the developing worlds. For example, it is a constituent part of the UN Peacebuilding Commission agenda and a key component of the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s approach.<sup>20</sup>

Constructivism also accounts for the systemic nature of security cooperation. By focusing on change, constructivism incorporates the inherent and iterative dynamism involved in multiple state interactions over time. It is primarily concerned with exploiting emergent phenomena to best effect through the creation of shared security cultures.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, constructivism provides a strong theoretical basis for understanding the rationale linking security cooperation (means), SSR (way) and stability (ends).

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<sup>19</sup> Malcolm Chalmers, “Spending to Save? The Cost-Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention”, *Defence and Peace Economics* 18, no. 1 (February 2007): 1–23. 1. The pound sterling ratio is from an earlier version of the paper presented at the Bottom Billion Conference, The Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, June 27, 2004.

<sup>20</sup> See “Concept Note: Working Group on Lessons Learned Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law for Peacebuilding”, *United Nations*, last modified October 26, 2011, accessed August 27, 2015, [http://www.un.org/es/peacebuilding/pdf/wgll-ssr-rol-concept\\_note.pdf](http://www.un.org/es/peacebuilding/pdf/wgll-ssr-rol-concept_note.pdf) and “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform”, *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development*, last modified February 25, 2008, accessed August 17, 2015, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform\\_9789264027862-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en)

<sup>21</sup> Müller, 620.

Conceptually, operational art provides a model of how to integrate ends, ways and means in the pursuit of national strategic objectives through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space and purpose. Furthermore, operational art provides a systemic approach that can exploit innate tensions between more open complex systems at the strategic level, such as those described above, and more closed, linear systems at the tactical level in order to realize security gains.

This mediating function between the strategic and tactical levels was the primary observation of Shimon Naveh in his explanation of operational art.<sup>22</sup> Naveh equated operational art in this fashion to a military version of general systems theory.<sup>23</sup> Alex Ryan reinforces Naveh's deductions on the nature of complex systems and in particular, the non-linearity and feedback characteristics they express that result in emergent phenomena constantly arising.<sup>24</sup> Both theorists conclude that approaches to understanding systems demand continuous contextualization based *inter alia* upon the "critical examination of simplifying assumptions" to produce novel options.<sup>25</sup> In short, operational art, as a dialogue exploiting the cognitive tension between strategic abstractions and tactical mechanisms, is a systemic approach.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: Evolution of Operational Theory* (United Kingdom: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 13-14.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>24</sup> Alex J Ryan, "What Is a Systems Approach?", last modified September 10, 2008, accessed August 5, 2015, <http://arxiv.org/abs/0809.1698>, 28.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>26</sup> Naveh, 7.

As such, in this idealized and aspirational form, operational art is an open system that exploits the interrelationship between strategy and tactics in novel ways that ought to ensure continuing advantage when executed effectively. In turn, this reflects an understanding of strategy, as espoused separately by Everett Dolman and Lawrence Freeman, as a continuous interplay of positioning whereby creating power more than the linear sum of its constituent parts is the driving aim of the system.<sup>27</sup>

Systemically exploiting the dialog and inherent tensions between strategy and tactics forms the basis of both American and British doctrinal definitions of operational art. The similarities between UK and US joint definitions of operational art make them effectively congruent.<sup>28</sup> The military doctrine of both countries, since the nineteen-eighties, has explicitly espoused operational art. For the militaries of both nations, it is the aspirational form of turning ideas into action. Consequently, operational art is a concept that is both appropriate and relevant to use in assessing the historical case study of PfP and for inferring applicable deductions for contemporary security cooperation initiatives.

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<sup>27</sup> Everett C Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 4 and Sir Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2013), xi-xii.

<sup>28</sup> UK: “The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles”. Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP 01), *UK Joint Operations Doctrine* (London, Ministry of Defence, November 2014), 125. Of note, this is also the NATO definition as published in AAP-06 (2014).

US: “The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means”, Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0) *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2011), GL13.

However, as Antulio Echevarria notes , “the literature on operational art does not adequately cover critical topics, such as stability and reconstruction operations, the very activities whereby, some would claim, wars are really won”.<sup>29</sup> Rather, operational art, in both its conceptual and more refined doctrinal definitions, primarily focuses upon decisive action, particularly phases II (Seize Initiative) and III (Dominate) of the US joint phasing construct.<sup>30</sup> Echevarria contends that operational art should equally focus on what he terms the second grammar of war, namely the activities that traditionally make up phases 0 (Shape), I (Deter), IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable civil authority).<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, as operational art evolves as a concept it is being applied in novel ways as befits an open systems approach. For example, in expounding the rationale behind the introduction of Integrated Action doctrine, General Sir Nicholas Carter identified “information manouevre” as a defining characteristic of contemporary conflict. To exploit this tendency, operational art is something commanders at all levels need to do in employing “methodologies which will be a range of things from soft through to hard power and you work out the best method of synchronising and orchestrating those range of effects to impart effect onto audience to achieve outcome.”<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Antulio J Echevarria II, “Reconsidering War’s Logic and Grammar”, *Infinity Journal* 1, no. 2 Spring (2011): 4–7.

<sup>30</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0) *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 11, 2011), V-5.

<sup>31</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria II, “American Operational Art 1917-2008”, in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161.

<sup>32</sup> General Sir Nicholas Carter KCB CBE DSO ADC, “The Future of the British Army: How the Army Must Change to Serve Britain in a Volatile World”, *Chatham House*, last modified February 17, 2015, accessed July 17, 2015, [http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field\\_document/20150217QBritishA](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150217QBritishA)

Heretofore, there has been no empirical analysis of PfP applying the concept of operational art. Given that PfP did not involve decisive action type activities and in line with Echevarria's contention, this is perhaps unsurprising. This is a gap that this research paper in part seeks to address. This will demonstrate the utility of PfP as an example for contemporary security cooperation initiatives. Nonetheless, throughout the programs existence, strategic and policy analysts have evaluated PfP as a form of security cooperation. Therefore, the analysis in this research paper will extrapolate from such studies the nature of how ends, ways and means were integrated to pursue strategic objectives. This section will analyze and draw parallels behind the genesis and intent of both PfP and contemporary security cooperation initiatives. The subsequent case study will compare and contrast their effectiveness.

In broad context, F. Stephen Larrabee, situated the underlying rationale behind PfP as part of a wide-ranging effort to “build a new NATO” ready for the challenges of the Post-Cold War “New Strategic Era.”<sup>33</sup> The overall unifying aim for extant NATO members and the US in particular was creating “a Europe whole and free.”<sup>34</sup> More prosaically, Ronald Asmus outlined the genesis of PfP as a means of forestalling the contentious enlargement debate in the early nineteen-nineties.<sup>35</sup>

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rmy.pdf. In subsequent comments to the Land Warfare Conference held at the Royal United Services Institute on July 3 2015, General Carter referred to Integrated Action as the “new operational art”.

<sup>33</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee, *NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2003), 2.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>35</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 34-36.

Asmus, subconsciously, described how the then Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Shalikashvili, conceived of the program as an act of operational art in August 1993.

{SACEUR} took the ideas circulating in the interagency process {regarding the pros and cons of enlargement} and packaged them in a way that squared the circle among boosting NATO's engagement with Central and Eastern Europe, avoiding alienating Russia, and not saddling the U.S. military with new commitments. Peacekeeping was one way to connect the dots among the different political imperatives. It was a new mission for NATO. By working together with these countries, NATO would inevitably develop a much closer set of relationships with these countries.<sup>36</sup>

This extensive quotation unpacks how a military commander conceived of orchestrating tactical actions (peacekeeping) to generate operational outcomes (military-to-military relations) that would engender a firmer foundation for the potential realization of a strategic culture that would deliver against political imperatives (regional stability). As such, it represents an exemplar of operational art that is almost breathtaking in its simplicity and brilliance in resolving competing security dilemmas and keeping options open for policymakers.

Gerald B. Solomon went further in highlighting the multiple sources of General Shalikashvili's conception of PfP.<sup>37</sup> One of the sources he identifies is the then deputy commander-in-chief, US European Command, General McCarthy. In September 1992, McCarthy recognized the gap between current strategic objectives and tactical actions, "Thus far, NATO has approached regional cooperation and the evolution of a new architecture with both lofty words

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 35. It cannot also pass unremarked the serendipity of a Polish born American General of Georgian descent being the progenitor of a process that contributed so much to securing a Europe whole and free. The apotheosis of the American dream resolving a recurring European nightmare? One suspects that VV Putin might contest this narrative.

<sup>37</sup> Gerald B Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Vol. 174: The Blessings of Liberty* (Westport (Connecticut): Greenwood Press, 1998), 26.

and cautious actions...A fresh new breeze from Evere [NATO headquarters in Belgium] would bring an anticipatory approach to Europe's potential security concerns, especially those in the East".<sup>38</sup> This is an example of an operational policymaker using operational art to exploit tensions between the strategic and the tactical levels to realize new forms with a systematic and open approach to problem solving.

However, such initiative was not without risk. Writing in 1995 for the National Defense University, James Morrison identified the fact that PfP effectively changed the goalposts and appeared to create a double standard that previous rounds of NATO expansion incorporating Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain did not apply. PfP therefore, if poorly executed, threatened to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty and with it the existing Euro-Atlantic security community.<sup>39</sup> However, the same analysis also identified the potential opportunities outweighed the risks and recommended that NATO should proceed with PfP and other initiatives whilst taking into account evolving NATO-Russia relations.<sup>40</sup>

In their essence, the examples of operational art displayed by Shalikashvili and McCarthy in the early nineteen-nineties prefigure the rationale behind the security cooperation missions of American and British forces in current times. Senior military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic recognized and anticipated emerging policy requirements (increasing budgetary constraints) and strategic dilemmas (a dynamic threat environment). The conception of both the

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>39</sup> James W. Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995), 127.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 129.

American RAF and British AF mission sets reflects much the same process undertaken by the senior NATO leadership in 1992-93. Military leaders in both countries sought to exploit tensions between inherently open strategic problems and the imperative to deliver tactical actions and remain relevant in the post Iraq and Afghanistan era. In doing so, they sought to develop options for policy makers at the strategic level. It is this baseline similarity between the evolution of PfP and contemporary security cooperation initiatives that give this study its rationale. Conducting an empirical case study of PfP should generate analysis that current practitioners will find applicable in levering outcomes at the policy and strategic levels.

It is the thesis of this paper that PfP provides empirical evidence demonstrating security cooperation is a proven means of pursuing strategic objectives that offers good value for money. It is possible to use this evidence to draw inferences for the application of operational art in contemporary security cooperation initiatives pursuing similar desired strategic conditions. The next section will generate the hypotheses and research questions that test this thesis.

This section demonstrated how a constructivist approach to IR theory serves as a theoretical framework that situates the relationship between security cooperation, SSR and regional stability. Furthermore, it illustrated how the historical unfolding of PfP prefigures similar dilemmas and responses today. These considerations demonstrate the applicability of PfP as a case study for contemporary security cooperation initiatives. The concept of operational art is a model of how to apply theory in exploiting the inherent tension between the more open systems of strategy with the more closed systems of tactical actions. The following methodology section will hone in on the criteria for selecting variables for analysis in line with a structured focus approach to the case study.

### **Section III - Methodology**

The following section details the research questions that will form the case study of this paper, the sources used and the process of analysis as it relates to the original thesis. This research project will follow the methodology set out by Alexander George and Andrew Bennet in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* in which they specifically designed the structured focus approach to “study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems”.<sup>41</sup> This fits neatly with the research objectives of this project in seeking to draw lessons about security cooperation for contemporary initiatives based upon the historical experience of Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The previous section explained the rationale for selecting a constructivist approach to security cooperation as the unique phenomena under consideration in this paper. George and Bennett identify the requirement to select “variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation. These should include variables that provide some leverage for policymakers to enable them to influence outcomes”.<sup>42</sup> In the instance of security cooperation, the primary variables policymakers can determine are the allocation and expenditure of funds on tactical actions such as exercises and training programs that influence outcomes at the policy and strategic levels. Military policymakers achieve this influence through the application of operational art. The literature review section also detailed the model of operational art as the integration of ends, ways and means in pursuit of strategic objectives through the arrangement of

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<sup>41</sup> Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (BCSIA Studies in International Security) (United States: The MIT Press, 2005), 66.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 68.

tactical actions in time, space and purpose. The research questions reflect constructivist theory that links security cooperation as the means and Security Sector Reform as a way with regional stability as the end. Operational art serves as the integrating concept.

The research questions consist of three groups. The first group addresses an analysis of PfP. The second group determines contemporary US and UK strategy ends and how the means of security cooperation ought to support them. The third group compares the first two groups in order to determine what applicable lessons there are for operational art in executing the contemporary American Army Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) and British Army Adaptable Force (AF) missions.

The first research question will determine what were the Allied Policy, Strategic & Military Objectives for PfP in 1994. Answering this broad question will demonstrate how demands to fill the security vacuum left by the collapse of communism created policy dilemmas for extant and aspiring members of the Euro-Atlantic security community. The adoption of PfP was *inter alia* able to meet these demands by creating a new rationale for NATO and enabled military-to-military relationships that ultimately engendered the creation of a new Euro-Atlantic security culture. The second question addresses measurements of PfP over the two decades from its inception in 1994. The primary variable will consider the amount of money spent over time by America and Britain. The secondary variable addresses the perceived Return on Investment (RoI) of PfP in 2015 to determine value for money. In light of recent Russian revanchism, it is likely that most analysts will perceive a high RoI. This deduction will however need to address the neo-realist theory that NATO expansion, in which PfP was a vital first step, was a primary cause recent Russian aggression.

The second group of research questions focuses upon current US, UK security cooperation initiatives and the specific policy objectives they support. The broad aims of supporting a norms based international order and enhancing regional stability to mitigate the threat of transnational issues associated with globalization are common to both British and American strategies.<sup>43</sup> It tests the hypothesis that there is currently a mismatch in the integration of ends, ways and means by analyzing various assessments of relevant measures undertaken thus far.

The third and final group of research questions will contrast current British and American security initiatives with the PfP case study to determine what the applicable differences/similarities are. This determination will enable analysis of key inferences from PfP for the application of operational art today. In line with Bennett and George's methodological aim of yielding actionable variables, the conclusion will synthesis the findings from the case study and summarize this monograph.<sup>44</sup>

This study will draw upon publically available unclassified documentation from American, British and NATO records. Secondary source expert analysis of PfP and current US, UK security cooperation strategies will supplement primary source analysis. The study will analyze the data for trends over space and time in the size and scope of size of budgetary allocations to PfP in relation to other types of spending. Independent qualitative and quantitative analysis of PfP spending will enable a judgement to be made on value for money in testing the

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<sup>43</sup> See Table 1 for relevant comparison of contemporary American and British national strategies.

<sup>44</sup> Bennet and George, 66.

first hypothesis. Analyzing the contemporary operating environment will rely on macro trends collated by research programs such as *Our World in Data* at the University of Oxford and the *Correlates of War* project hosted by a conglomeration of American Universities.<sup>45</sup>

In summary, security cooperation is a category of activity and events that can be systematically analyzed using the structured focus approach detailed by George and Bennett. In so doing, it will produce evidence and deductions that contemporary practitioners can exploit in applying operational art. The case study in the next section will demonstrate that the selection of PfP as a historical case study provides useful inferences for military planners in the RAF and AF executing contemporary security cooperation initiatives.

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<sup>45</sup> See <http://ourworldindata.org/> and <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> respectively.

## **Section IV - Case Study**

The following case study consists of three parts. The first part examines Partnership for Peace (PfP), the second part analyzes contemporary US and UK security cooperation initiatives and the third part compares the first two to draw out inferences for the contemporary application of operational art. Together the case study is as an exemplar of the theories and concepts laid out in the previous sections to assess the validity of the original thesis. Namely, PfP provides empirical data that demonstrates security cooperation is a proven means of pursuing strategic objectives. PfP represents a successful integration of means (security cooperation), ways (Security Sector Reform) and ends (regional stability) that exploited the inherent tension between strategy and tactics. As such, it represents effective operational art. Consequently, PfP serves as a ready example for contemporary practitioners orchestrating the missions of US Regionally Aligned Forces and UK Adaptable Forces in pursuit of their respective national strategic objectives. This section begins with a short overview of the context underlying the case study before answering the structured focus questions outlined in the preceding methodology section.

### **Partnership for Peace**

The unravelling of the Cold War paradigm that took place between the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 created multiple dilemmas for security stakeholders on both sides of the now defunct Iron Curtain. Successor regimes, who rapidly replaced the old communist order, sought to secure themselves and cement the post-communist transition from autarchy to democracy. Multiple overlapping strands made up this enormous societal transformation. Economic and political reforms built new liberal and democratic institutions. Judicial reform and lustration defanged the yawning divergence between reconciling and punishing previous regimes' crimes. Military and police reforms placed armed

forces and law enforcement agencies under democratic political control. In broad conceptual terms, the administrations of the newly democratic countries sought to legitimate their existence under the aegis of supranational and intergovernmental institutions who could provide assistance in managing difficult transitions in each of these spheres and more.

At the same time, pressing security issues presented themselves on the agenda for the extant NATO states. These ranged from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the securing of the former USSR's nuclear stockpile to the violent and protracted collapse of Yugoslavia. The latter case in itself presents a microcosm of the level of violence that could have manifested itself in the wider post-communist space were the transition not actively managed by Euro-Atlantic institutions and national stakeholders.

Tracing the arc of intergovernmental institutional development in the nineties, it would be ahistorical to imagine that there was an underlying overall systematic design. Instead, it was haphazard and ad hoc. This exemplifies the emergent properties of the international system following the collapse of the Cold War paradigm. Nonetheless, is it accurate that there was appetite in both existing members and post-communist states for constructing new security structures and relationships; in effect to conduct SSR as a way to achieve stable and normative relations between former adversaries. The level of appetite varied over time and space with consensus built up as relationships evolved.

As a rule of thumb, the closer the capital of a post-communist state to Moscow the lesser the appetite to embrace fully the transition from autarchy to democracy.<sup>46</sup> There is not a corresponding correlation regarding distance from Brussels that determines the enthusiasm of

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<sup>46</sup> With sincere apologies to the citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

existing member states for expansion of inter-governmental organizations. Taking these factors into account, the problem frame was relatively simple. Extant western intergovernmental organizations would provide financial support and expertise in order to secure post-communist states' democratic transitions with the promise of membership or enhanced partnership as the agreed goal. These joint endeavors would stabilize relations between former adversaries and contribute to the realization of "A Europe whole and free".<sup>47</sup>

In the military sphere, NATO responded to initial requests for new relationships with former communist states by forming the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 1991. NACC envisioned the continued existence of the USSR and no enlargement of NATO, although did not rule it out. Events quickly overtook the original premise of this initiative. The collapse of the USSR in December 1991 emboldened Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to announce their NATO membership aspirations in May 1992.<sup>48</sup> Nonetheless, NACC remained as the forum to engage with post-communist states while the wider debate on NATO enlargement went on in both member and aspirant states. Because of the ambiguity surrounding NATO enlargement, NACC was primarily a talking shop rather than an executive body.<sup>49</sup> The imperative to go beyond a simple forum for dialogue in the NACC to a substantive relationship short of full NATO membership was therefore a driving factor behind the creation of the PfP initiative as illustrated in the literature review section.

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<sup>47</sup> President George H.W. Bush, "A Europe Whole and Free", May 31, 1989, accessed January 31, 2016, <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm>.

<sup>48</sup> Asmus, 17.

<sup>49</sup> Solomon, 16.

The Partnership for Peace program began on 11 January 1994 with an open invitation to members of the NACC and the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to participate.<sup>50</sup> PfP remains a central part of NATO outreach activity today. In total, 34 countries signed the PfP framework document, 12 of whom have since joined NATO.<sup>51</sup> The nature of the program intentionally varied according to the priorities of each participant nation. Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) specify these priorities. The open system of the design allowed for multi-vector relationships between NATO and partner countries to develop with a measure of flexibility that matched evolving political circumstances. The overall range of the activities included fits within the broad spectrum of security cooperation and SSR as defined in the introduction.

The first set of questions below determines the original goals of the program, their outcomes and perceptions of the Return on Investment(RoI). The second set of questions will consider contemporary US and UK strategic objectives and how security cooperation ought to support them. This will enable subsequent comparison between the historic example of PfP to contemporary measures in the third set of questions to draw relevant inferences for the practice of operational art.

The first structured question that is examined determines the specific NATO allied policy, strategic and military objectives for PfP and to what degree they were achieved. It finds

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<sup>50</sup> The CSCE was the precursor to the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that 35 states formed by signing the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, <http://www.osce.org/whatistheosce>.

<sup>51</sup> Presuming Montenegro accepts the invitation to join NATO issued on 3 December 2015 and that the subsequent accession talks are successful, it will become the 13th new member since 1989.

that the broad aims laid out in 1994 were achieved. The Invitation and Framework documents published on 11 January 1994 lay out the purpose of Partnership for Peace.<sup>52</sup> The Invitation stated, “The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance”.<sup>53</sup> NATO’s policy aim was to provide for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area that could “be achieved only through cooperation and common action”.<sup>54</sup> NATO explicitly based this goal on the shared values of fundamental human rights, democratic principles and a reaffirmation of the Helsinki final act.<sup>55</sup> The documents also frame PfP as linked to the possibility of NATO expansion, although the size and scope of any potential enlargement remained unresolved at that time. The documents offered membership of PfP as an inducement to increasing the likelihood of future membership of NATO; “Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO”.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> See Appendices 2, 3 & 4 respectively for the PfP Framework, Invitation and Signatory list documents.

<sup>53</sup> *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 11, 1994), see Appendix 3.

<sup>54</sup> *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 11, 1994), see Appendix 4.

<sup>55</sup> The Helsinki Final Act, initially signed by 35 countries in 1975 and by a further 22 countries since, stipulates wide ranging normative principles governing relations between Euro-Atlantic countries that *inter alia* guarantee territorial integrity and sovereignty.

<sup>56</sup> *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document*.

To underpin these policy goals, the documents also laid out a set of strategic and military objectives. These include transparency in defense planning and budgeting, democratic control of armed forces, and cooperative military relations with NATO to enable increasing interoperability between partner and NATO armed forces.<sup>57</sup> NATO HQ facilitated these objectives by opening up permanent facilities for partner countries in Brussels and establishing a partnership coordination cell to conduct the military planning to implement PfP activities.

Both documents iterate the bespoke nature of the program in a fashion that is indicative of an open system approach. “At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we {NATO member states} will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed”.<sup>58</sup>

Ultimately, the documents are avowedly constructivist in seeking to create new norms in international relations by exploiting the emergent properties of the environment. The means of security cooperation were to be combined with the ways of reform to achieve the ends of enhanced regional stability and security. Rather than determine a closed system of rigid timelines or standardized minutiae, an open system of Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) emerged to allow partner countries to determine their own priorities and pace of reform. This is instructive for conducting further detailed analysis of the program for any future specific application.

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<sup>57</sup> *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document.*

<sup>58</sup> *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document.*

Assessment of the relationship between inputs and outputs must contextualize proportionate metrics such as money invested with wider and more intangible factors such as perceived returns that drive future behavior.

Given the open and extended nature of this framework, assessing the success of the original policy goals and strategic objectives threatens to be a laborious process. It need not be for the purpose of this paper. On a purely institutional level the fact that NATO has expanded the menu of 1400 activities eventually conceived as part of PfP to all its partnerships is a strong indicator of success. If PfP had been unsuccessful as a means for enabling political military cooperation it would not have been replicated as a model for all NATO global partnerships in 2011.<sup>59</sup> A further measure of the success of PfP is the fact that such partnerships are, since 2014, one of the three core pillars of the NATO Strategic Concept.<sup>60</sup>

Judging the goals of increasing stability and diminishing threats to security in the Euro-Atlantic region, the recent emergence of Russian revanchist tendencies has led to crowing by some neo-realists seeking to legitimate their narrative that NATO expansion, in which PfP played a critical role, caused Russia to respond belligerently.<sup>61</sup> Quite apart from the sovereign imperative

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<sup>59</sup> *Partnership Tools* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 13, 2014), last modified November 13, 2014, accessed December 13, 2015, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_80925.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_80925.htm).

<sup>60</sup> *Strategic Concepts* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 11, 2014), last modified November 11, 2014, accessed December 14, 2015, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm).

<sup>61</sup> See for example, John J Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin”, *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (September 2014): 77–89 and Alexander Lukin, “What the Kremlin Is Thinking: Putin’s Vision for Eurasia”, *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 4 (July 2014): 85–93.

of allowing countries to choose their alliances free from outside interference, this criticism fails to address the fact that in a realist framework Russia would nevertheless seek to expand regardless of NATO policy.

Therefore, from a practical standpoint, containing such tendencies with an alliance of 28 nations, pondering, for example, how to defend the “Suwalki Gap” against Russia (and presumably its reluctant vassal, Belarus) is self-evidently preferable to an alliance of 16 nations seeking to defend the Fulda Gap facing the Soviet 3rd shock army and associated Warsaw Pact forces.<sup>62</sup> For all the countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, arguably including Russia, the *status quo post* is demonstrably better than the *status quo ante* whatever theoretical perspective one chooses to adopt in assessing the goals laid out in the 1994 PfP framework and invitation documents. This contention will be expanded upon in answering the next structured question.

The second structured question determines the relationship between the cost of PfP to the perceived Return on Investment (RoI) in 2015. Answering this question will determine perceptions on value for money of PfP as a means for pursuing the strategic objective of stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. It examines the metric of public expenditure dedicated to PfP by the US and the UK over the life of the initiative since 1994 to enable analysis of the perceived Return on Investment in those countries. It finds clear evidence in the case of the United States relating PfP expenditure to a perceived high RoI. In spite of a paucity of equivalent evidence for the United Kingdom, alternative analysis of perceptions of RoI are available to answer the question.

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<sup>62</sup> Jorge Benitez, "Is NATO's new Fulda gap in Poland?", November 24, 2015, accessed December 13, 2015, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/is-nato-s-new-fulda-gap-in-poland>.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) periodically produces reports to Congressional Committees auditing US expenditure in support of NATO programs.<sup>63</sup> These reports are a rich seam of information that detail the scale and scope of US commitment to NATO in general and PfP in particular. Additionally, the Washington based non-profit Center for International Policy “Security Assistance Monitor” website independently analyzes US security assistance spending worldwide. Correlating these two sources of information and analysis provides a large and reliable data set on the amount of US investment in PfP.

The United States funds PfP activity through the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF). This was established in 1994 and operates under Department of Defense Title 10 authority but has at times also included funds allocated to the State Department. It is administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) who oversee and manage the funds under the umbrella of the Defense Institution Building Program.<sup>64</sup> The fund is solely for PfP countries that the World Bank terms as “developing”.<sup>65</sup> From 1996 to 2005 the annual fiscal year expenditure averaged \$43 million. Between 2006 to 2010 this figure was \$29 million.<sup>66</sup> Taken together this gives an overall spend on the WIF of approximately \$550 million between 1996-2010. These figures are borne out

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<sup>63</sup> The GAO has produced twenty-three reports on various aspects of US-NATO relations between 1990-2015. Eleven that pertain directly to this study are detailed in the bibliography.

<sup>64</sup> *Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF)* (Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency), accessed December 12, 2015, <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/warsaw-initiative-funds>.

<sup>65</sup> GAO-10-1015, *NATO Partnerships: DOD Needs to Assess U.S. Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, November 10, 2010), accessed September 17, 2015, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1015>, 30.

<sup>66</sup> GAO-10-1015, 30.

by those reported by Security Assistance Monitor. They also report that despite plans to further curtail allocations to WIF to \$18 million per annum by 2018 there was an increase to \$34 million in 2015.<sup>67</sup> This fact alone infers that the program has renewed utility in the eyes of pentagon policymakers.

Regrettably, the UK's National Audit Office (NAO) has not seen fit to conduct similar levels of audit of MOD foreign military aid spending as the GAO does for the Pentagon. Likewise, there is no dedicated think tank program such as the Security Assistance Monitor to independently analyze such spending. It is possible to extract broad figures on defense spending on security cooperation from the Treasury's annually published Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis (PESA). The overall spend is not insignificant. For example, in 2009 annual UK foreign military aid peaked at £3.6 billion, representing almost ten percent of the defence budget.<sup>68</sup> However, these self-reported numbers alone are not sufficient to determine the UK's monetary contribution to specific countries or multilateral programs.

Requests by the author under freedom of information rules for specific amounts did not yield usable figures.<sup>69</sup> Neither the MOD nor the NAO track the expenditure detailing the UK's

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<sup>67</sup> Figures extracted from “A Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Security and Defense Assistance”, *Security Assistance Monitor*, last modified August 25, 2015, accessed September 1, 2015,  
[http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Warsaw%20Initiative/2006/2010/is\\_all/Global](http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Warsaw%20Initiative/2006/2010/is_all/Global)

<sup>68</sup> “HMT Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA)” (HM Treasury, 2009), last modified 2009, accessed December 12, 2015,  
[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/238595/7630.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238595/7630.pdf), 74.

<sup>69</sup> Email correspondence between author and MOD and NAO officials September – December 2015.

specific contribution to PfP for example. This oversight leaves the United Kingdom exposed to wide ranging questions about its commitment to transparency and accountability in demonstrating value for money for taxpayers. From a practical standpoint the lack of available figures makes it more difficult for military policymakers to justify future resource allocation requests seeking to validate the theory of security cooperation as an effective means of pursuing regional stability. Regardless of the *prima facie* strength of the argument that prevention is better than cure, in an age of sustained budget pressure, being meticulous in justifying every pound spent would seem a prudent measure.

Nonetheless, assessing RoI in security cooperation is necessarily a matter of perception and not just a simple cost benefit analysis. For example, in 1997, a GAO report found that in regard to PfP the impact ‘cannot be measured in quantifiable terms’.<sup>70</sup> In spite this stipulation, a further GAO report in 1997 did reference separate studies by RAND and the Congressional Budget Office that projected U.S. cost shares of NATO expenditure in response to various threat scenarios, including a resurgent Russia, as being between \$5B and \$13.1B in constant 1996-97 dollars.<sup>71</sup> Given these underlying cost assumptions, the relatively inexpensive measure of PfP is an attractive investment in seeking to allay potential future contingency costs.

Taken as a whole, the series of GAO reports are a valuable source of assessment in determining perceived RoI. As an objective and impartial observer, the GAO is dedicated to

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<sup>70</sup> GAO/NSIAD-97-164, *NATO Enlargement: U.S. And International Efforts to Assist Potential New Members* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, June 27, 1997), accessed November 17, 2015, <http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-97-164>, 10.

<sup>71</sup> GAO/NSIAD-97-209, *NATO Enlargement: Cost Estimates Developed to Date Are Notional* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, August 18, 1997), accessed November 17, 2015, <http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-97-209>, 13.

holding the federal government to account for its expenditure. The fact that it consistently writes favorably on PfP in eleven related reports over the period 1995-2010 and recommends its continuance in the latest report is strong evidence of a high level of perceived RoI.

To further assess perceived RoI it is important to situate US investments in PfP within the wider context of related spending. For example, the State Department also plays a significant role in security assistance. A 2002 US Office of Management and Budget report on assistance to NATO aspirant countries found that DoD and State programs were not always complimentary but nevertheless rated the overall assistance as ‘moderately effective’ meaning that the assistance ‘set ambitious goals and is well-managed’.<sup>72</sup> This is one further indication of a positive perception of the RoI of which PfP was a crucial part.

Within the DoD itself, the Warsaw Initiative Fund sits alongside multiple other initiatives.<sup>73</sup> In the period 2001-2010, WIF allocations represented 3.6 percent of US military aid to PfP signatory countries<sup>74</sup>. This figure is significantly distorted by the relatively large amount spent on the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. This accounted for 60 percent of US military aid to PfP countries between 2001-2010.<sup>75</sup> Controlling for CTR, WIF represents 9

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<sup>72</sup> “Military Assistance to New NATO and NATO Aspirant Nations”, *ExpectMore.gov*, last modified September 6, 2008, accessed December 13, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/expectmore/detail/10000386.2002.html>.

<sup>73</sup> The table at Appendix 5 provides an illustrative snapshot from FY 2009 of related non WIF security assistance funds going to the 16 eligible PfP countries from the DoD.

<sup>74</sup> The figures include the twelve countries that have since joined NATO.

<sup>75</sup> This program, authorized by the 1991 Soviet Nuclear Reduction Act, is run by a separate agency in the DoD. It is aimed at reducing the threat from weapons of mass destruction and associated infrastructure in the former Soviet states. Through the CTR program, Russia received 36% (\$2.5B) of the total US military aid to PfP countries between 2001-2010

percent of the total spend in military aid to PfP signatory countries between 2001-2010. By far the biggest proportion of non-CTR military aid to PFP countries over the same period consisted of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which made up 56 percent of US military aid.<sup>76</sup> By law, FMF is spent on American made goods and services.<sup>77</sup>

The correlation between WIF and FMF is an important factor in assessing perceived ROI. Arguably, in line with constructivist theory as discussed in the literature review, PfP engendered security relationships that resulted in vast fiduciary benefits for the wider US economy. In this regard, a total investment of \$550 million in PfP over the period 1994-2010 contributed to an annual windfall between 2001-2010 of \$154 million spent in FMF by PfP countries on US products. The relative importance of this contribution is debatable. FMF is by no means limited to PfP countries. Nonetheless, it is worth considering that the billions of dollars' worth of FMF sourced US hardware now in the hands of the so-called Islamic State, courtesy of the Iraqi Security Forces, is an example of the perils of extending credit to countries with whom you do not share a strong security culture.<sup>78</sup> In contrast, PfP has contributed to creating a relatively stable market for US goods and services.

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<http://www.securityassistance.org/content/cooperative-threat-reduction>.

<sup>76</sup> Figures extracted from “A Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Security and Defense Assistance”, *Security Assistance Monitor*, last modified August 25, 2015, accessed September 1, 2015, [http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Warsaw%20Initiative/2006/2010/is\\_all/Global](http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Warsaw%20Initiative/2006/2010/is_all/Global).

<sup>77</sup> *Foreign Military Financing (FMF)* (Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency), accessed December 13, 2015, <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-financing-fmf>.

<sup>78</sup> Eric Schmitt and Tim Arango, “Billions from U.S. Fail to Sustain Foreign Forces”, *The New York Times*, October 3, 2015, accessed December 14, 2015,

In addition to assessing perceptions of RoI in the United States and in the lamentable absence of equivalent evidence to do the same for the United Kingdom, academic analysis of the outcomes of PfP provides alternative perspectives to assess the worth of the initiative. As strategic commentators, albeit with varying levels of access and influence, academics contribute to and very much reflect the policymaking milieu. Consequently, they provide further perspective on the perceived RoI regarding PfP and the wider security architecture it contributes to.

A clear example of this dynamic is the 2010 analysis of NATO partnerships by Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer. Their policy recommendations for streamlining extant partnerships and elevating them to a central position in the NATO Strategic Concept were adopted wholesale, initially in 2011 and then fully at the Wales Summit in 2014.<sup>79</sup> Sten Rynning, who approaches the topic from a more skeptical theoretical perspective, nevertheless sees NATO partnerships as a crucial part of managing Euro-Atlantic security.<sup>80</sup> From a more post-modern perspective, Trine Flockhart sees the value of NATO partnerships in their contribution to narrative construction.<sup>81</sup>

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[http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/world/middleeast/uss-billions-fail-to-sustain-foreign-forces.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&\\_r=2&referer=http://t.co/UIMKX286H6](http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/world/middleeast/uss-billions-fail-to-sustain-foreign-forces.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=2&referer=http://t.co/UIMKX286H6)

<sup>79</sup> Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer, “Creating the next generation of NATO Partnerships”, *The RUSI Journal* 155, no. 1 (March 10, 2010): 52–57, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071841003683443>. accessed December 14, 2015. *Strategic Concepts* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 11, 2014), last modified November 11, 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_56626.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm), accessed December 14, 2015.

<sup>80</sup> Sten Rynning, “The Geography of the Atlantic Peace: NATO 25 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall”, *International Affairs* 90, no. 6 (November 2014): 1384, accessed March 31, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12175>.

<sup>81</sup> Trine Flockhart, “Towards a Strong NATO Narrative: From a “practice of Talking” to

These views demonstrate that a broad consensus exists across the theoretical spectrum of liberal institutionalism, neorealism and constructivism that NATO partnerships are worth sustained investment based upon the successful outcome of PfP. These specific examples reflect the broadly positive view of NATO enlargement, of which PfP was a crucial part, amongst strategic commentators. For example, in response to John Mearsheimer's contrarian view cited above, a Foreign Affairs' "*Brian Trust*" survey found that twice as many experts disagreed as agreed with the proposition that "The West provoked Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression in Russia's near abroad by expanding NATO and the EU after the Cold War."<sup>82</sup>

The evidence above points to almost uniformly positive perceptions of the RoI in PfP that reflect the overall success of the initiative. The fact that in 2011 NATO replicated the model to cover all its global partnerships and then elevated it to a central position in its strategic concept in 2014 is evidence of its institutional success. Likewise, that the US DoD increased WIF spending in 2015 despite a previously projected decline is indicative of the programs worth as part of the wider NATO response to Russia's revanchist tendencies. Most indicatively, the consistent trend of positive reporting by the independent GAO is strong evidence that PfP provides good value for money especially considering the underlying assumptions at that time about the potential costs of a resurgent Russia. Finally, the strong security culture engendered by PfP is evidenced both by the high levels of FMF in PfP countries and the overall strong support it has received from strategic commentators on both sides of the Atlantic.

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a "practice of Doing", *International Politics* 49, no. 1 (January 2012): 89, accessed March 31, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ip.2011.31>.

<sup>82</sup> "Who Is at Fault in Ukraine?", *Brain Trust (Foreign Affairs*, November 9, 2014), last modified November 9, 2014, accessed December 13, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-11-09/who-fault-ukraine>.

Consequently, the hypothesis that PfP provides evidence that security cooperation is a proven means of pursuing strategic objectives is supported. This is in spite of the lack of available analysis of the United Kingdom's specific financial contribution. One has to assume that if the United Kingdom did not perceive a high RoI that they would not have supported the new NATO Strategic Concept that elevates partnerships to a central position at the Wales summit in 2014.

#### Contemporary security cooperation

The next two structured focus questions move on to examine contemporary American and British security cooperation initiatives. This is to enable effective comparison in the final set of questions in this case study. They test the hypothesis that there is a mismatch in the integration of ends, ways and means in contemporary American and British security cooperation initiatives pursuing certain desired strategic conditions. The analysis finds the hypothesis only partially supported. Mostly, this is because they are nascent. Unlike PfP, which has been running for over twenty years, the current American and British initiatives are in their infancy and therefore the relevant data does not yet exist to judge them in equivalent fashion. Furthermore, from an ontological perspective, analysis of the direction and guidance issued alongside initial assessments of the measures undertaken thus far demonstrates significant integration of ends, ways and means. The measures undertaken seek to employ open systems that anticipate complexity in the operating environment using operational art to resolve inherent tensions between the strategic and tactical to ensure positions of relative advantage are maintained. In short, they ought to work in the same way that the open nature of PfP worked in delivering against set objectives with corresponding high levels of perceived RoI.

In order to test the mismatch hypothesis, it is first necessary to define the specific relationship between the ends, ways and means relevant to the strategic conditions being pursued

by the United States and the United Kingdom. This enables the subsequent assessment that forms the fourth structured question evaluating the measures taken thus far.

Given the plethora of policy and strategic guidance issued by the governments and militaries of both America and Britain between 2010-2015, it is perhaps surprising that there is a remarkable degree of overlap. Nevertheless, there is significant alignment between the strategic objectives of both countries, their approaches and commensurate levels of transformation and investment in resourcing the means of security cooperation as one way amongst many to achieve those objectives.

This common interrelationship between national ends, ways and means is illustrated in the headline analysis of relevant American and British policy and strategy documents issued between 2010-2015 as presented in Table 1. Both countries seek to uphold global norms to ensure stability. Both countries seek to employ security cooperation as a means to achieve this end. Both countries share an activist approach that seeks to influence partners by assisting them to reform security sectors and build their capacity to abide by normative behavior.

Table 1. Select US and UK strategic direction and guidance pertaining to security cooperation 2010-2015.

<b>Year</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Remarks</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>2010</b>	National Security Strategy	4 Enduring Interests: 1. Security 2. Prosperity 3. Values 4. International Order	National Security Strategy: <i>A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty</i>	2 National Security Objectives: 1. Ensuring a secure and resilient UK. 2. Shaping a stable world.
			Strategic Defence and Security Review	Detailed 8 National Security Tasks: 4 directly supported by defence engagement.

<b>2011</b>	National Military Strategy	4 National Military Objectives: 1. Counter Violent Extremism 2. Deter and Defeat Aggression 3. Strengthen International and Regional Security 4. Shape the Future Force	DFID, FCO & MOD: Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)	Articulates the rationale of seeking stability, resourcing upstream prevention and envisions the whole of government response.
<b>2013</b>	Fact Sheet: Presidential Policy Directive 23: <i>Security Sector Assistance</i>	4 Goals: 1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges 2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests 3. Promote universal values, such as good governance 4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations 9 guidelines to implement whole of government approach.	International Defence Engagement Strategy	Articulates how UK defence engagement aims to enhance British prosperity, influence and security by linking defence engagement ways and means to wider HMG objectives.
	A Strategic Vision for future bilateral cooperation between the armies of the United States of America and the United Kingdom signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).		3 Objectives: 1. Contingency 2. Security Cooperation 3. Engagement	

<b>2015</b>	National Security Strategy	Sustains 4 Enduring Interests: 1. Security 2. Prosperity 3. Values 4. International Order	National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review: <i>A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom</i>	3 National Security Objectives 1. Protect people 2. Project global influence 3. Promote prosperity  Defence Engagement specified as a core MOD task for first time.
	National Military Strategy	3 National Military Objectives: 1. Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries. 2. Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations. 3. Strengthen our global network of allies and partners.		

*Source:* Collated by author (full references contained in bibliography).

It is not within the ambit of this study to parse each of these documents. Rather the purpose of the table is to illustrate the wide ranging sources of extant direction and guidance and the iterative nature of policy and strategy making. However, it is clear from deeper analysis of these documents that the theme of normative partnerships is prevalent in both American and British strategy as a way to maintain their respective positions as *status quo* powers. Although ostensibly a neoliberal institutionalist ontology, this is equally recognizable as a constructivist approach to international relations that seeks to exploit emergent phenomena to both protect and create new norms that ensure regional stability.

One of the primary means to achieve this shared desired condition is through enhanced security cooperation with partner nations across the globe. Enacting these means aims to both

build partner capacity to contribute to regional security and improve American and British understanding of regional power dynamics to enable better management of potentially destabilizing events. Both countries also envision and aspire to a whole of government approach that integrates all elements of national power in delivering against these objectives.

Focusing upon the land component contribution to this approach, the key document for this study, and perhaps the single most remarkable illustration of the degree of overlap between American and British national and military strategies, is the Bilateral Vision Statement (BVS) issued in March 2013 by the respective heads of both armies, the American Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and the British Chief of the General Staff (CGS). The statement represents both a distillation of all the various policy guidance given to them by their political masters and the outcome of their successful anticipation of changes in the operating environment that underpinned the transformation efforts of both armies that is discussed further below.

The BVS document sets out three shared objectives: Contingency, Security Cooperation and Engagement.<sup>83</sup> Pertinent to this study, the objective of Security Cooperation is to “Build Partnerships and third-party partner capacity, as appropriate, to enable the land forces of other nations to contribute to a peaceful and stable world” whilst remaining “*Eager* to advance the cause of multilateralism by their combined efforts, including with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ program(ABCA).”<sup>84</sup> For both armies therefore, the end of stability is to be sought through the ways of multilateralism and the means of security cooperation. The document is an example of

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<sup>83</sup> A copy of the BVS is at Appendix 1

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

the level of integration of ends, ways and means, that is taking place and as such represents operational art in action. Given this specific direction, the question then arises to what degree has their shared vision in this regard been realized.

Prior to and since this combined direction was issued in March 2013, both armies have undertaken significant measures to integrate the ends, ways and means identified above.

Identifying and assessing these measures is the aim of the fourth structured question in order to further test the hypothesis that there is a mismatch in contemporary ends, ways and means relating to security cooperation. Transformation is the primary measure that both armies have undertaken in the period 2010-2015.

The scale and scope of the structural changes made to both the British and American armies' over the past five years is extensive. Transformation was the response of both armies to anticipated changes in their respective operating environments.<sup>85</sup> Facing an end to enduring stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside rapidly tightening fiscal circumstances, both armies sought updated ways to offset reduced means and meet evolving ends. In sum, the process of transformation afforded both armies the opportunity to remain relevant in offering new options for policy makers that promised better results at reduced costs in comparison to the costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The evolution and various outcomes of these measures are the US Globally Responsive and Regionally Aligned Forces and the UK Reaction and Adaptable Forces as initially outlined in the 2010 US Army Operating Concept and the UK Future Army

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<sup>85</sup> Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff, *Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991-2012* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

Structures work, originally started in 2008, that resulted in the Army 2020 announcement in 2012.<sup>86</sup>

As a measure of the effectiveness of these efforts in relation to security cooperation a study of external and internal secondary analysis was undertaken. Table 2 below illustrates a broad selection of primarily external analysis that various bodies have conducted on American and British security cooperation efforts and related structural changes since 2010. Taken together, these wide ranging reports enable tentative conclusions on the efficacy of security cooperation so far as a means of pursuing the ends of regional stability outlined above.

Table 2. Select assessments of US and UK security cooperation initiatives 2010-2015

<b>Year</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Key Recommendations</b>
2011	Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries The Cases of Australia, France and the United Kingdom	RAND Corporation	“Focus on improving joint and interagency partnering and planning, combining resources, and partnering with allies when national interests align”. 86
2012	Review of the Conflict Pool <sup>87</sup>	UK National Audit Office	“The new joint strategy is a positive move in clarifying high level objectives, but its implementation plan lacks clear focused outcomes”. 8
2013	What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Under What Circumstances?	RAND Corporation	“Matching matters: BPC is most effective when U.S. objectives align with PN objectives and when BPC efforts align with the partner’s

<sup>86</sup> Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 25 and “Army 2020: Transforming the British Army for the Future” (Ministry of Defence, July 5, 2012), last modified July 5, 2012, accessed January 18, 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/army-2020-transforming-the-british-army-for-the-future>.

<sup>87</sup> UK MOD Defence Engagement activities are partially funded from the tri-departmental (FCO, DFID, MOD) Conflict Pool.

			baseline capabilities and absorptive capacity Context matters: Certain characteristics or features of PNs make BPC more likely to be effective.” 87
2014	Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions, opportunities, and threats of partnering.	Robert Johnson. Oxford University	“Successful cases were the result of very specific contexts, which may not be transferred easily to different regions”. 647
2014	Army 2020: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.	UK National Audit Office	“The Army has made progress in implementing structural changes and reducing the size of the regular Army, but the transition to the new Army structure comes with some significant further risks. If not mitigated, they could significantly affect value for money and the Army’s ability to achieve its objectives”. 6
2014	Future Army 2020	House of Commons Defence Committee	“Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British Army. It departs significantly from the announcements made in SDSR 2010 and we have considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK’s national security”. 62
2015	What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?	RAND Corporation.	“many of the contextual challenges encountered stem from or are exacerbated by shortcomings in U.S. policy or practice. Especially when working with a partner whose characteristics or behaviors contribute to contextual challenges, it is critical that U.S. contributions be well coordinated and conducted”. 43
2015	A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework	RAND Corporation	“Effective assessment provides a good analytic foundation from which to make process

			improvements or to focus accountability and resource allocation”. xiii
2015 (2012)	Crisis and Conflict Prevention Strategies: An International Comparison USA, UK, France and Germany.	RAND Corporation	“While varying in their specific strategic positions, all four countries tend towards long-term, civilian-led prevention activities”. 103
2015	Regionally Aligned Forces	Government Accountability Office	“the use of brigades to conduct activities beyond their typical mission sets has revealed some gaps in the systems that the Army is using to train and equip regionally aligned forces”.44
2015	Report to Congress. Assessment on Regionally Aligned Forces	HQ, Department of the Army.	“The Army’s regionally aligned forces provide the basis for the Army to remain globally responsive and regionally engaged in a budget constrained environment”. 12
2016	Friends, Foes, and Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World	RAND Corporation	“New threats from potential adversaries have created anxiety among U.S. regional partners that could be converted into greater burden-sharing. Managed properly, greater collaboration can work”. xiv

*Source:* Collated by the author (full references contained in bibliography).

The broad ranging nature of these reports is evidence in itself of the level of ongoing integration of ends, ways and means as it relates to security cooperation. More piecemeal efforts would not generate as wide a response. Despite the diverse audiences these reports are aimed at, the broad thread linking them is that enhanced partnerships and capacity building efforts are welcome but that they nonetheless remain aspirational. Taken together, the analysis demonstrates that perceptions of the potential RoI of security cooperation amongst key audiences runs the gamut from cautiously optimistic at best to downright skeptical at worst. There is as yet no

consensus that security cooperation will necessarily contribute to desired strategic conditions. In terms of operational art there is not yet a compelling narrative to link strategic aspiration with tactical activity. Critical therefore to achieving sustained success, similar to that achieved by PfP, is the ability to demonstrate good value for money through tangible outcomes.

Testing the hypothesis that there is a mismatch in the current integration of ends, ways and means relating to RAF and AF contributions to security cooperation is therefore partially supported. There is evidently a large amount of operational art in the integration and design underlying concepts behind RAF and AF. However, as yet the narrative linking strategic aspirations with tactical activity is not as compelling as it is relating to PfP.

This deduction reveals an inherent dilemma in the integration of ends, ways and means as it relates to security cooperation, capacity building/SSR and regional stability. This is because it demands the proof of a negative in circumstances where causality is unlikely to be linear. It reflects the classic dilemma posed by deterrence theory as captured by Everett Dolman whereby, “The absence of a challenge alone does not prove that the fielded force...was the reason or cause of the lack of combat...the measurable criteria of victory are difficult if not impossible to assess”.<sup>88</sup> This tension between a closed system of a tangible relationship between inputs and outputs and an open system of non-contiguous outcomes is exactly the type of tension between tactics and strategy that operational art is designed to mediate. It does this in part by contributing to the substantiation of compelling narratives that persuade relevant audiences.

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<sup>88</sup> Dolman, 9.

## Inferences from PfP for contemporary operational art

This dilemma leads to the fifth and sixth structured questions of this case study. They test the hypothesis that it is possible to use the example of PfP to draw inferences for the application of operational art in resolving the dilemmas inherent in contemporary American and British security cooperation initiatives. The answers to these questions find the hypothesis partially supported. There are applicable lessons for contemporary operational art when understood in the appropriate context. However, the environmental frame and consequent operational environments are relatively more complex today, although not necessarily more consequential, than the problems presented by the collapse of communism in Europe from 1989 onwards. Consequently, contemporary practitioners should not seek to directly replicate PfP or assume, *sua sponte*, that because security cooperation worked then that it will necessarily work now. Nevertheless, the success of PfP can form part of contemporary narrative substantiation in legitimizing efforts to build partner capacity and ensure regional stability.

The fifth structured question determines the applicable differences and similarities between PfP and current security cooperation initiatives. It considers them in terms of strategic context and specific approaches taken integrate ends, ways and means. Applicability is broadly determined with reference to operational art and the purpose of this study as outlined in the introduction and literature review. Specifically, applicability is judged in line with the methodological approach of yielding actionable variables. It finds similar systemic and operational approaches but comparison of the post-cold war environment with today reveals differing conceptions of security and degrees of freedom that define the operating environment for both the American and British armies. These differences reflect the increased complexity of the environmental frame.

One immediately clear parallel that exists between the conception of PfP and current security cooperation initiatives is in the vision of senior military leaders. Facing the uncertain dilemmas of a post Iraq and Afghanistan world, they sought to set the agenda by proposing radical changes to the structures of their respective armies. This resulted in security cooperation becoming a major facet of both armies' visions as expressed jointly in the 2013 BVS document and separately in the respective transformations carried out by the British and American armies as discussed previously. Security cooperation is a means of retaining relevance in a resource constrained environment whilst also providing for feasible options to civilian policy makers to gainfully employ military forces abroad. As noted in the literature review section, this process is similar in fashion to how the then Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Shalikashvili conceived of PfP in the early nineties. It resolved tensions between the strategic and tactical by providing a rationale for the sustained resourcing of certain means and emergent institutional ways. Visionary leadership enabled significant institutional transformation to take place ensuring that the integration of ends, ways and means was primarily proactive and not reactive.

A key further applicable parallel is the open and systemic approaches designed to enable PfP and security cooperation initiatives today. Both PfP and contemporary initiatives in America and Britain as reflected in the direction, doctrine and evaluation represented in Tables 1 and 2, exhibit the properties of systems thinking. This open approach enables effective anticipation, adaptation and learning within organizations to create systems that are well placed to exploit emergent properties and seek to either amplify or dampen delayed feedback loops as required. For example, the expansive menu of 1400 activities that exist under PfP is a form of efficiency

diversity that increases the probability of success by offering large amounts of choice.<sup>89</sup> Over time and as a result of repeated interaction, relationships develop that potentially generate positive tendencies.<sup>90</sup> This in turn increases understanding and generates options for policy makers. As a generic model which works for PpP there is good reason to emulate it further afield.

In this aspirational and idealized form, security cooperation, well executed, increases the likelihood of successfully identifying and achieving leverage in a system. This harnessing of systemic tendencies to create power greater than the sum of its parts reflects Freedman's definition of strategy.<sup>91</sup> This increased power enables actors to gain or sustain positions of relative advantage in Dolman's conception of strategy.<sup>92</sup> Ultimately, if so desired and following the tenets of constructivist theory, it will lead to the creation of enhanced security partnerships and new security cultures that hedge against potential adversaries.<sup>93</sup> In this manner it links directly to the idea of strategy as espoused by Gray who posits that strategy is a fundamental human need based upon organizing collective action for the purpose of security.<sup>94</sup> In sum, as proposed in the literature review section, there are sound theoretical reasons to find similarities

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<sup>89</sup> Dietrich Dörner and Rita Kimber, *The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What We Can Do to Make Them Right* (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1997) 53-54.

<sup>90</sup> "Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning", *Government Printing Office* (Washington, DC., August 11, 2011), last modified August 11, 2011, accessed October 4, 2015, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp5\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf), III-11

<sup>91</sup> Freedman, xi-xii.

<sup>92</sup> Dolman, 4.

<sup>93</sup> Müller, 621-622.

<sup>94</sup> Colin S. Gray, *The Future of Strategy* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 7.

between PfP and today. It stems from the fact that security cooperation, as a standalone concept, is fundamental to contemporary definitions of effective strategy that are weaved into western doctrine.<sup>95</sup>

These similarities therefore demonstrate there is indeed broad scope for drawing inferences from PfP today in applying operational art. These will be explored in answering the sixth structured focus question. However, the differences in the strategic context as outlined below demonstrate the need to contextualize any such inferences taken from PfP before applying them today.

The first key difference lies in the assumption on the value of security cooperation as a commodity. Contemporary military strategy on both sides of the Atlantic assumes there is sufficient “demand” from potential consumers for the proposed increase in American and British “supply”. Whilst in the nineties consumer demand was clearly articulated in forums such as the North Atlantic Coordination Council, which eventually led to shared understanding and common approaches between suppliers and consumers, it is far less clear that there are mechanisms for demand to be modulated in a like manner today. The perils of a purely supply side approach to security cooperation match the economic dangers of assuming trickle down effects automatically producing net benefits in any given system. There is a risk that the means of security cooperation justifies and becomes the end itself without the interspersed mediating function of ways such as multilateralism or shared security sector reform goals to match supply and demand.

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 48. See also *The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015) British Army Doctrine Note 15/01 *Integrated Action* (Warminster, Directorate Land Warfare, 2015).

A corollary risk of the means of security cooperation becoming the end in itself lies in the contention that RAF and AF concepts are forces in search of a mission. According to this line of argument, both armies have thus far undertaken multiple bilateral security cooperation initiatives under the aegis of RAF and AF driven more by a need to demonstrate the success of their respective transformation programs. Therefore, it is arguable that tactics is driving strategy. This portentous tendency is evident in the work of Huw Strachan; “Cowper-Coles {former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan} is right when he identifies the current generation of soldiers as shrewd political operators who have managed to manipulate politicians who are both in thrall to their professional expertise and naïve about war. He is justified in his criticism of what he has called 'supply- side strategy', in other words that strategy becomes defined in terms of its means not its ends”.<sup>96</sup> Absent tangible outcomes from contemporary security cooperation therefore, there is a risk of increasing irrelevance and incoherence with national policy objectives.

Perhaps the most consequential difference between the circumstances of today and the post-cold war period is the nature of the environmental frame. The problem of Euro-Atlantic security in the nineties was less complex. The very fact that the six syllable refrain of “A Europe whole and free” served as both vision and unifying purpose is emblematic in this regard.<sup>97</sup> In more academic terms, the theoretical approach of neo-liberal institutionalism offered a construct that satisfied the key stakeholders as represented by extant and aspirant members and partners of various IGOs.

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<sup>96</sup> Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 90.

<sup>97</sup> President George H.W. Bush, “A Europe Whole and Free”, May 31, 1989, accessed January 31, 2016, <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm>.

The broad theoretical approach of neo-liberal institutionalism delivered unparalleled human security and development over the last fifty years in general and twenty-five in particular. As measured by the median increase in the Human Development Index since 1960 or the declining rate of battle deaths since 1945, the world has never been so secure nor have the traditional sources of insecurity such as poverty been so thoroughly ameliorated.<sup>98</sup> It is therefore unsurprising that states undergoing transitions from autarchy would seek to cement their place within it. The liberal world order was and should remain a going concern. Nevertheless, substantiating a similar narrative today is far harder today due to the increased complexity of the environment.

For instance, the quantitative analysis cited above crucially fails to take into account evolving perceptions of security held by the vast majority of stakeholders in the west reacting to the increased impact of non-traditional actors in the international system. The proposed paradigmatic shift to “wars amongst the people” of the digital age, away from industrial age “interstate war” as articulated by General Rupert Smith, has dramatically altered conceptions of security.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Max Roser (2015), “Human Development Index”, *Our World in Data*, accessed January 18, 2016, <http://ourworldindata.org/data/economic-development-work-standard-of-living/human-development-index/> and Max Roser (2015), “War and Peace after 1945”, *Our World in Data*, last modified 2015, accessed January 16, 2016, <http://ourworldindata.org/data/war-peace/war-and-peace-after-1945/>.

<sup>99</sup> Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 16-17.

For the past fifteen years, the primary security concern for both America and Britain is the threat posed by international terrorism.<sup>100</sup> In relation to security cooperation, the response of policy makers has been to focus on tactical counter terrorism measures. The Counter Terrorism imperative altered perceptions of security cooperation that compressed the perceived Return on Investment (RoI) in time, space and purpose. This imperative remains dominant in spite of significant evidence that such means alone are ineffective.<sup>101</sup> For example, one recent study found an investment of nearly eighty billion dollars by the United States over the last decade on security cooperation primarily dedicated to counter terrorism did not deliver consistent results and may have in fact increased incidences of terrorism.<sup>102</sup>

This ominous tendency reflects a shifting the burden archetype of system response. The myopic focus on the symptomatic problem of terrorism has failed to address root causes and unintentionally served to undermine consensus that the liberal world order is still fit for purpose in spite of all the empirical evidence to the contrary that the world is as safe and stable as it has ever been. This vicious paradox is at the heart of Peter Senge's interpretation of the global war on terror as a self-reinforcing spiral of instability.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> See Table 1 for references to prioritized threats.

<sup>101</sup> Robert Johnson, "Upstream Engagement and Downstream Entanglements: The Assumptions, Opportunities, and Threats of Partnering", *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 3 (2014): 647–668.

<sup>102</sup> Matthew Saintsing, "Does Security Assistance Reduce Terrorism?", *Small Wars Journal*, last modified August 26, 2015, accessed August 31, 2015, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/does-security-assistance-reduce-terrorism>.

<sup>103</sup> Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group, 2006), 71.

In addition to this perceived strategic miasma, the re-emergence and re-prioritization of state based threats in both the 2015 American National Military Objectives and the 2015 British Strategic Defence and Security Review demonstrate changes in the strategic context that further increases the complexity of the operating environment. Although General Smith argues that industrial age interstate war is a thing of the past, it is instructive that the latest security strategies of both the United States and the United Kingdom elevate the risk of interstate war compared to their 2010 iterations.<sup>104</sup>

The reemergence of overtly adversarial geo-political tendencies and a multi-polar power structure has long been predicted. Indeed, Müller, writing specifically with regard to the constructivist approach to security cooperation, noted this ominous tendency, “the extension of the zone of democratic peace is, by the logic of the theory, the secure way towards eternal global peace. However, an increasing number of democratic states working together in the security field may appear threatening for nondemocratic states who are not participating in security cooperation with the democratic community. Feeling overwhelmed, these countries may then seek security in more armament. Moscow's response to NATO enlargement, echoed in Beijing, confirms this mechanism”.<sup>105</sup> The scope of western ambition in extending normative behavior is somewhat limited by significant actors in the international system whose own particular sense of fear, honor and interest generates competitive and incompatible strategies.<sup>106</sup> In response, it is reasonable to posit that if such tendencies will always exist in the global system then is it preferable to hedge

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<sup>104</sup> See Table 1 for comparison.

<sup>105</sup> Müller, 619.

<sup>106</sup> Gray, 6.

against them by constructing strong security cultures based upon substantive partnerships using limited aims in times of peace.<sup>107</sup>

In sum, based upon both the similarities and differences in strategic context there are good reasons to draw inferences from the evidence that PfP provides. However, any such understanding must take into account the increased complexity of the international system. Given this increased complexity, the sixth structured focus question determines what the key inferences for modern day practitioners of operational art are as they execute security cooperation campaigns. It finds four key inferences from the analysis above for contemporary operational art executing security cooperation missions and tasks. Taken together, these inferences demonstrate that operational art ought to be able to exploit inherent tensions to ensure that security cooperation remains a profitable source of leverage in the international system. However, it requires a shift in focus from the traditional “first grammar” tendency that Echevarria notes as predominant in western approaches to operational art to a broader approach of operational art as the conduct of strategies.<sup>108</sup>

The first key inference is that increased complexity requires a more experimental approach to security cooperation than arranging tactical actions in pursuit of specified strategic objectives traditionally allows for. Given the contemporary lack of an explicit unifying purpose to modulate supply and demand, accruing mutually acceptable goals to providers and consumers

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<sup>107</sup> Thomas G Mahnken, “Small States Have Options Too: Competitive Strategies against Aggressors”, *Commentary* (War on the Rocks, January 27, 2016), last modified January 27, 2016, accessed January 27, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/small-states-have-options-too-competitive-strategies-against-aggressors/>.

<sup>108</sup> Echevarria II, “American Operational Art 1917-2008,” in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, 161 and Echevarria II, “Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* (January 22, 2016): 1–15, 8.

alike will take longer and be more susceptible to dissonance. The requisite flexibility to accommodate such an experimental approach can be drawn directly from the efficiency diversity employed as part of PfP previously noted. The logic of PfP in eventually expanding its menu to 1400 activities worked because it was bounded by Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). Such a structure allowed for increased and decreased levels of partnering as relations developed and political circumstances evolved. This in-built flexibility of the system was cemented through a multilateral approach. Multilateralism served as one way to modulate supply and demand through a third party that moderated the discourse between producer and consumer to create sustainable partnerships.

The second direct inference therefore is wherever possible to seek multilateral ways through recourse to IGOs like the UN, AU, OSCE to modulate the proposed supply of security cooperation with the demand of partner nations. The integrating concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) serves as a further way to sustainably match supply and demand using IGOs involved in development aid. Such a multilateral approach using familiar and tried concepts such as SSR will facilitate trust over time increasing the potential for positive tendencies. The primary risk of multilateralism lies with the increased opacity inherent in involving third party organizations. This is a risk for generating evidence of value for money. However, this is outweighed by the increased likelihood of burden sharing by and avoidance of duplication of effort amongst allies as well as reducing the risk of creating bilateral dependencies.

The success of PfP is itself a testament to the effectiveness of multilateralism. The explicit aspiration to emulate this multilateralism in the BVS is instructive.<sup>109</sup> For the senior

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<sup>109</sup> See appendix 1.

leadership of both armies, it serves as an example of the successful integration of ends, ways and means. This continuity hints at how PfP in itself can contribute to effective narrative construction aimed at multiple audiences. Namely, security cooperation is a proven means that is cost effective, that contributes to new security cultures and strengthens positions of relative advantage. PfP, especially since NATO made partnerships central to its strategic concept, offers a significant body of reference to substantiate narratives about the nature and intent of security cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions. PfP generated a plausible narrative that consistently appealed to a broad range of security actors.

The third key inference is the need for applying operational art with regard to security cooperation is the need to consistently substantiate narratives aimed at multiple domestic and foreign audiences. Narrative is emerging as a concept in both British and American military doctrine. Initially, it focused inward and was premised upon generating more accurate understanding of the specific military problem at hand.<sup>110</sup> Nonetheless, more recently, the Integrated Action concept in the UK and the latest US Army Operating Concept both envisage information and associated narratives as objects to be contested.<sup>111</sup> Ultimately, perception drives the behavior of actors and states. Perception is deeply shaped by the sense given by narrative to events, relationships and artefacts.

In order to increase the likelihood of security cooperation successfully contributing to enhanced regional stability, effective narrative substantiation will be essential in generating

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<sup>110</sup> See for example, US Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008)

<sup>111</sup> British Army Doctrine Note 15/01 *Integrated Action* (Warminster, Directorate Land Warfare, 2015), 14. US Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 *The Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 11.

requisite levels of perceived RoI in domestic audiences; appropriate levels of moderated demand in partner audiences and sufficient uncertainty to deter adversarial audiences. In front of each of these audiences, narratives will be contested by alternative and competing narratives deployed variously by partners and adversaries seeking to make sense to their own multiple audiences. As Dolman posits, any given strategy, “is qualitatively—not quantitatively—judged. It is better or worse, relative to another strategy”.<sup>112</sup> Narrative contestation therefore requires effective persuasion of the relevant audience to be effective.<sup>113</sup>

The fourth key inference from comparing PfP to today is that the nature of complex adaptive systems will generate emergent properties that threaten the stability of the system. This is evidenced in the outright challenges to authority and order that terrorism represents and in the competitive strategies of geopolitical rivals. However, the re-emergence of more overtly adversarial global geopolitics is not reason to doubt the validity of constructivist theory underpinning security cooperation but instead it validates it. Security cooperation, through the creating of networked security cultures is a form of balancing that when well executed can control or diminish potential adversaries’ options.<sup>114</sup>

In this regard, PfP does demonstrate how the means of security cooperation, combined with SSR as a way, achieved the end of regional stability that consequently improved relative

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<sup>112</sup> Dolman, 12.

<sup>113</sup> Emile Simpson, *War from The Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics* (United Kingdom: C Hurst & Co Publishers, 2012), 211-213.

<sup>114</sup> Lukas Milevski, “Revisiting J.C. Wylie’s Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patterns of Operations”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35, no. 2 (April 2012): 223–242, 223.

advantage regarding a self-declared regional adversary. Russia, while undoubtedly able to act as a spoiler in global affairs, is equally unable to act as a normative power.<sup>115</sup> Its prevailing self-serving narrative of victimhood does little but highlight startling levels of paranoia to its prospective regional partners and allies.<sup>116</sup> It remains to be seen if concomitant integration of ends, ways and means can contribute to similar outcomes of sustained relative advantage in relation to the Middle East or Asia-Pacific regions. It is worthwhile noting that building static and shallow aircraft carriers in the typhoon prone South China Sea may appear to serve self-perceived Chinese national interests. Nevertheless they are not an obvious hedge to the fact that China's neighbors continue to seek to advance their security and economic interests through enhanced partnerships with the United States.<sup>117</sup> China and Russia, in different ways, are shaping up to be rule breakers but both look unlikely to be in a position of sufficient relative advantage to be subsequent rule makers precisely because they are unable to effectively balance western partnerships and alliances built upon decades of mutually profitable security cooperation.

In response to terrorism, the vortex of the Middle East shows the perils of tying security cooperation too tightly to short term bilateral imperatives. However, when coupled with effective SSR, security cooperation can tackle the root causes. The silence we hear from the threat of

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<sup>115</sup> James Sherr, *The New East-West Discord: Russian Objectives, Western Interests* (Netherlands: Clingendael, December 22, 2015), accessed January 31, 2016, <http://www.clingendael.nl/publicatie/new-east-west-discord-russian-objectives-western-interests>.

<sup>116</sup> The fact that Belorussian President Alexander Lukashenko has not recognized Russia's annexation of Crimea speaks volumes about Russia's normative capacity. "Europe's Last Dictator" (*The Economist*, October 10, 2015), last modified October 10, 2015, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21672234-nail-biting-election-incumbent-looks-scraping-home-europes-last-dictator>.

<sup>117</sup> The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the most obvious recent instance.

terrorism present in the Philippine archipelago is deafening in this respect. A strong shared security culture between the US and the Philippines and the judicious use of discrete military activities has repeatedly dampened down any amplifying feedback that may have disrupted the security system in the South Western Pacific.

By way of summary, this case study consisted of three parts designed to test the thesis that PfP is a proven instance of the means of security cooperation contributing to the ends of regional security modulated by the ways of Security Sector Reform. The evidence of this successful integration of ends, ways and means provides inferences from which modern day planners can infer to plan and execute contemporary security cooperation initiatives.

The first part of the case study found substantial evidence that PfP is a proven instance of successful security cooperation that achieved its objectives and generated sustained high levels of perceived value for money. The second part found the hypothesis that there is a mismatch in the integration of current ends, ways and means in American and British security cooperation initiatives was only partially supported. There are high levels of integration ongoing, particularly in the transformation both armies have undertaken, but it is too soon to make conclusive judgements as to their efficacy regarding security cooperation. The third part of the case study tested the contention that PfP provides inferences for contemporary operational art. Again, the analysis of available evidence produced mixed results. There are direct inferences to be made with PfP built upon as a point of reference, but the diverse nature of the differing problem frames tempers the findings. The relatively structured problem of NATO partnering in the nineties does not map across to the increased complexity present in the contemporary operating environment. These findings will be synthesized in the concluding section.

## **Section V - Conclusion**

The aim of this research paper was to test the thesis that Partnership for Peace (PfP) provides empirical evidence demonstrating the soundness of using security cooperation as a means for pursuing the end of regional stability modulated by Security Sector Reform as a way. In turn, the inferences from this evidence will prove useful for military planners executing contemporary security cooperation initiatives pursuing similar conditions.

Analysis of the evidence surrounding PfP considering the goals it was originally set by NATO and in relation to perceptions of Return on Investment (RoI) amongst key stakeholders demonstrated that the program was an unqualified success. This part of the thesis is fully supported. Inferences drawn from PfP are useful but the increased complexity of the contemporary environmental frame demonstrate the requirement to apply contextual understanding. Consequently, support for the second half of the thesis is caveated and predicated upon understanding how circumstances have evolved and the tendencies they portray in the international system.

In drawing inferences from the success of PfP, modern practitioners, seeking to integrate ends, ways and means and apply operational art, must take into account the differing perceptions of security and varying degrees of freedom that operate today. Yet, especially when applied through the lens of complexity theory, the similarities between both circumstances are evident. Designing and operating open systems that anticipate complexity, learn from previous instances and adapt to changing circumstances was as central then as it is now to the application of effective operational art.

It is also significant that the analysis of PfP demonstrated how security cooperation, well executed, contributes to effective strategy in the sense of it as understood by Freedman, Dolman

and Gray. Respectively, that strategy is the art of creating power that enables the gaining and maintaining of positions of relative advantage which above all is reflective of a fundamental human activity to pursue security through collective action. To wit, security cooperation is a central feature of British and American visions of the future operating environment precisely because it forms a fundamental component of the definition of effectiveness that underpins much of western strategic understanding.

Nevertheless, in spite of this observation, the primary concept for turning ideas into action in western militaries, operational art, remains predominantly preoccupied with physical maneuver and the reification of decisive action. Forcing decision is one strategy amongst many others. Privileging it above all others is not conducive to balanced or prudent decision making at all levels.

Practically speaking, four key inferences for modern day operational art from the analysis of evidence surrounding Pfp as a case study were determined. Taken together they demonstrate how operational art in relation to security cooperation should be conceived as the conduct of strategies and not the pursuit of decisive action.

The first inference is that contemporary security cooperation must adopt an experimental approach to account for the increased complexity in the international system. Absent a grand unifying strategy, there is a need to build coherence over time.

The second inference is that in order to modulate varying degrees of supply and demand, multilateral approaches through Intergovernmental Organizations adhering to concepts such as Security Sector Reform offer a more viable and sustainable structure than bilateral partnerships do.

The third inference is that to build coherence over time and amongst multiple audiences, foreign and domestic operational art must focus on narrative substantiation in the execution of security cooperation missions and tasks.

The fourth inference is that increased complexity will generate increased emergence in the international system. This will include significant challenges to the established system from state and non-state actors. Security cooperation, in its vital contribution to strong security cultures based upon substantive narratives and multilateralism, is a crucial component in the operation of a resilient system. It helps manage inherent change and thereby protects the unprecedented gains made by the liberal world order from shocks and other destabilizing feedback. Upstream capacity building is not only cost effective in preventing subsequent costly interventions but also in shaping theaters by diminishing and controlling potential adversaries' operational options.

When accurately situated therefore, Pfp remains a worthwhile ongoing case study of how to execute an effective security cooperation program that successfully integrates ends, ways and means. Amongst a seeming litany of partnering failure during the Global War on Terror, it serves as a ready source of historical good practice that can be adopted for contemporary best fit approaches that still seek novelty in responding to constant emergence in the international system.

This deduction serves as an appropriate inflection point to consider how future research may further contribute to understanding the challenges of applying operational art in executing security cooperation missions. The work of Antulio J. Echevarria II raises important concerns about the state of operational art in the western military mindset.

Further specific inquiry into the application of operational art as the conduct of strategies will prove fruitful in bolstering the doctrinal depth of operational art. In the same way that Eisenhower's famous dictum that plans are worthless but planning is everything, reminds of the

tension in detailed military planning, Echevarria's contention that strategies are worthless but strategizing is everything should serve as a spur to action in understanding how to manage multiple strategies as part of operational art.<sup>118</sup> With regard to further security cooperation research, classified access to reports of ongoing security cooperation campaigns will provide a goldmine of data to further test the basic assumptions this paper rests on.

Ultimately, security cooperation is a means amongst many, but one that is central to the western network of alliances and partnerships that guarantees the security of the international system. With the increase in complexity in the international system that has resulted in the inevitable emergence of significant near term threats and medium term risks, the creation and maintenance of strong security cultures offers a strong hedge against uncertainty and an effective means to promote the universal norms that have delivered and continue to deliver unprecedented human development.

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<sup>118</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Op-Ed: Is Strategy Really a Lost Art?", *Strategic Studies Institute*, last modified September 13, 2013, accessed October 1, 2015, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Is-Strategy-Really-A-Lost-Art/2013/09/13>.

## Appendix 1

### A STRATEGIC VISION FOR FUTURE BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

*Mindful* of exceptionally close cooperation between the Armies of the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) since 11 September 2001, as part of the broader and enduring defense and security relationship that exists between the two nations;

*Wishing* to preserve and build upon that cooperation for the future;

*Acknowledging* that current operations will end and that both Armies will revert from campaigning to adopt a contingency posture;

*Recognizing* that the USA and UK will remain key partners on operations and in conflict prevention, sharing the burden for building the capacity of other nations, and engaging in various bilateral and multi-lateral fora;


*Eager* to advance the cause of multilateralism by their combined efforts, including with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' program (ABCA);

*Without* creating legal obligations by this shared vision, and without prejudice to the nations' own competing priorities;


*Consistent* with the policies of the United States Department of Defense and the British Ministry of Defense:

1. **Strategy.** The Armies will work towards three shared objectives:
  - a. **Contingency.** Identify and close relevant land interoperability (operational compatibility) gaps;
  - b. **Security Cooperation.** Build partnerships and third-party partner capacity, as appropriate, to enable the land forces of other nations to contribute to a peaceful and stable world;
  - c. **Engagement.** Deepen their close and long-standing bilateral engagement to support these objectives.
2. **Contingency.** The priority for interoperability (operational compatibility) will be to enable a UK division to operate effectively within a US Corps and a UK brigade to operate effectively within a US division, and to enable a US Brigade Combat Team to operate effectively within a UK division and a US division to work effectively within the UK-framework NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Lessons from current and recent operations and from exercises and experiments will be used to identify and rank key interoperability (operational compatibility) requirements and gaps, and the practical remedial implications of these will be determined, with respect to affordability, technical feasibility, policy and legal considerations, and broader multi-lateral agenda.

3. **Security Cooperation.** While supporting the policies of their respective governments to build partnerships and third-party partner capacity, the Armies will harmonize their defense security cooperation strategies, as appropriate, in order to de-conflict their efforts, maximize and synchronize their effect – including with respect to multi-lateral organizations – and alleviate the burden of commitments.
4. **Engagement.** The Armies will sustain and deepen their bilateral engagement by: maintaining a program of high-level contacts; maintaining exchange and liaison programs; maintaining a program of unit and formation affiliations; and developing a common understanding of global and regional security challenges.
5. **Training and Support Objectives.** In support of these objectives, the Armies will contribute to each other's capabilities by: sharing lessons; exploring opportunities for combined training, experimentation and education, bilaterally and multi-laterally (including through the use of distributed training); developing mutually supporting niche capabilities.



General Raymond T. Odierno  
Chief of Staff of the Army



General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen  
Chief of the General Staff

27 March 2013

27 March 2013

## Appendix 2



# Partnership for Peace: Framework Document

**Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council**

10 Jan. 1994 - 11 Jan. 1994 | Press Release Annex to M-1(1994) 002 Issued on 11 Jan. 1994  
| Last updated: 30 Oct. 2009 15:17

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.
2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.
3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

- a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

5. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

- a. those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
- b. they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
- c. they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
- d. those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
- e. building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been

taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;

f. they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

- o develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
- o promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

3. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

## Appendix 3



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

# Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document

**issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council**

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10 Jan. 1994 - 11 Jan. 1994 | Press Release M-1(1994) 002 Issued on 11 Jan. 1994 |  
Last updated: 30 Oct. 2009 15:52

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We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities.

The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

## Appendix 4



# Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document

Last updated: 10 Jan. 2012 11:23

Countries	Signed by	Date
Albania <sup>4</sup>	PDT Sali Berisha	23.02.94
Armenia	FM Vahan Papazian	05.10.94
Austria	FM Alois Mock	10.02.95
Azerbaijan	PDT Geidar Aliyev	04.05.94
Belarus	FM Uladzimir Syanko	11.01.95
Bosnia and Herzegovina	PDT Nebojša Radmanović	14.12.06
Bulgaria <sup>3</sup>	PDT Jelu Jelev	14.02.94
Croatia <sup>4</sup>	FM Tonino Picula	25.05.00
Czech Republic <sup>2</sup>	PM Vaclav Klaus	10.03.94
Estonia <sup>3</sup>	FM Jüri Luik	03.02.94
Finland	FM Heikki Haavisto	09.05.94
Georgia	FM A.Chikvaidze	23.03.94
Hungary <sup>2</sup>	FM Jeszensky	08.02.94
Ireland	FM Andrews	01.12.99
Kazakhstan	FM Saudabayev	27.05.94
Kyrgyz Republic	PDT Askar Akayev	01.06.94
Latvia <sup>3</sup>	PM Valdis Birkavs	14.02.94
Lithuania <sup>3</sup>	PDT Brazauskas	27.01.94
Malta	DPM/FM Guido de Marco	26.04.95
Moldova	PDT Mircea Snegur	16.03.94
Montenegro	PDT Filip Vujanovic	14.12.06
Poland <sup>2</sup>	PM Pawlak	02.02.94
Romania <sup>3</sup>	FM Melescanu	26.01.94
Russia	FM Andrei Kozyrev	22.06.94
Serbia	PDT Boris Tadić	14.12.06
Slovakia <sup>3</sup>	PM Meciar	09.02.94

Slovenia <sup>3</sup>	PM Janez Drnovsek	30.03.94
Sweden	FM Margaretha Af Ugglas	09.05.94
Switzerland	FM F. Cotti	11.12.96
Tajikistan	AMB. Sharif Rahimov	20.02.02
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia <sup>1</sup>	Head of Government Crvenkovski Branko	15.11.95
Turkmenistan	DPM B. Shikmuradov	10.05.94
Ukraine	FM Zlenko	08.02.94
Uzbekistan	FM Saidmukhtar Saidkasimov	13.07.94

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

2. These countries joined NATO on 16 March 1999

3. These countries joined NATO on 29 March 2004

4. These countries joined NATO on 1 April 2009


## Appendix 5

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**Appendix III: Other U.S. Security Cooperation Programs Supporting WIF and Pfp Goals**

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**Figure 8: Funding for Pfp Countries from WIF and Related Security Cooperation Programs, Fiscal Year 2009**



Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

Notes: 1) In addition to these programs, Kyrgyz Republic received \$9,572,000 in Section 1206 funding in fiscal year 2009. 2) Over \$11 million of the WIF budget in fiscal year 2009 was classified to a multiple country category, which reduced the WIF funds attributed to individual countries.

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